The most prevalent notions of fairness in machine learning are statistical definitions: they fix a small collection of high-level, pre-defined groups (such as race or gender), and then ask for approximate parity of some statistic of the classifier (like positive classification rate or false positive rate) across these groups. Constraints of this form are susceptible to (intentional or inadvertent) fairness gerrymandering, in which a classifier appears to be fair on each individual group, but badly violates the fairness constraint on one or more structured subgroups defined over the protected attributes (such as certain combinations of protected attribute values). We propose instead to demand statistical notions of fairness across exponentially (or infinitely) many subgroups, defined by a structured class of functions over the protected attributes. This interpolates between statistical definitions of fairness, and recently proposed individual notions of fairness, but it raises several computational challenges. It is no longer clear how to even check or audit a fixed classifier to see if it satisfies such a strong definition of fairness. We prove that the computational problem of auditing subgroup fairness for both equality of false positive rates and statistical parity is equivalent to the problem of weak agnostic learning -which means it is computationally hard in the worst case, even for simple structured subclasses. However, it also suggests that common heuristics for learning can be applied to successfully solve the auditing problem in practice.
Introduction
As machine learning is being deployed in increasingly consequential domains (including policing [Rudin, 2013] , criminal sentencing [Barry-Jester et al., 2015] , and lending [Koren, 2016] ), the problem of ensuring that learned models are fair has become urgent.
Approaches to fairness in machine learning can coarsely be divided into two kinds: statistical and individual notions of fairness. Statistical notions typically fix a small number of protected demographic groups G (such as racial groups), and then ask for (approximate) parity of some statistical measure across all of these groups. One popular statistical measure asks for equality of false positive or negative rates across all groups in G (this is also sometimes referred to as an equal opportunity constraint [Hardt et al., 2016] ). Another asks for equality of classification rates (also known as statistical parity). These statistical notions of fairness are the kinds of fairness definitions most common in the literature (see e.g. Kamiran and Calders [2012] , Hajian and Domingo-Ferrer [2013] , Kleinberg et al. [2017] , Hardt et al. [2016] , Friedler et al. [2016] , Zafar et al. [2017] , Chouldechova [2017] ).
One main attraction of statistical definitions of fairness is that they can in principle be obtained and checked without making any assumptions about the underlying population, and hence lead to more immediately actionable algorithmic approaches. On the other hand, individual notions of fairness ask for the algorithm to satisfy some guarantee which binds at the individual, rather than group, level. This often has the semantics that "individuals who are similar" should be treated "similarly" [Dwork et al., 2012] , or "less qualified individuals should not be favored over more qualified individuals" [Joseph et al., 2016] . Individual notions of fairness have attractively strong semantics, but their main drawback is that achieving them seemingly requires more assumptions to be made about the setting under consideration.
The semantics of statistical notions of fairness would be significantly stronger if they were defined over a large number of subgroups, thus permitting a rich middle ground between fairness only for a small number of coarse pre-defined groups, and the strong assumptions needed for fairness at the individual level. Consider the kind of fairness gerrymandering that can occur when we only look for unfairness over a small number of pre-defined groups:
Example 1.1. Imagine a setting with two binary features, corresponding to race (say black and white) and gender (say male and female), both of which are distributed independently and uniformly at random in a population. Consider a classifier that labels an example positive if and only if it corresponds to a black man, or a white woman. Then the classifier will appear to be equitable when one considers either protected attribute alone, in the sense that it labels both men and women as positive 50% of the time, and labels both black and white individuals as positive 50% of the time. But if one looks at any conjunction of the two attributes (such as black women), then it is apparent that the classifier maximally violates the statistical parity fairness constraint. Similarly, if examples have a binary label that is also distributed uniformly at random, and independently from the features, the classifier will satisfy equal opportunity fairness with respect to either protected attribute alone, even though it maximally violates it with respect to conjunctions of two attributes.
We remark that the issue raised by this toy example is not merely hypothetical. In our experiments in Section 5, we show that similar violations of fairness on subgroups of the predefined groups can result from the application of standard machine learning methods applied to real datasets. To avoid such problems, we would like to be able to satisfy a fairness constraint not just for the small number of protected groups defined by single protected attributes, but for a combinatorially large or even infinite collection of structured subgroups definable over protected attributes.
In this paper, we consider the problem of auditing binary classifiers for equal opportunity and statistical parity, and the problem of learning classifiers subject to these constraints, when the number of protected groups is large. There are exponentially many ways of carving up a population into subgroups, and we cannot necessarily identify a small number of these a priori as the only ones we need to be concerned about. At the same time, we cannot insist on any notion of statistical fairness for every subgroup of the population: for example, any imperfect classifier could be accused of being unfair to the subgroup of individuals defined ex-post as the set of individuals it misclassified. This simply corresponds to "overfitting" a fairness constraint. We note that the individual fairness definition of Joseph et al. [2016] (when restricted to the binary classification setting) can be viewed as asking for equalized false positive rates across the singleton subgroups, containing just one individual each 1 -but naturally, in order to achieve this strong definition of fairness, Joseph et al. [2016] have to make structural assumptions about the form of the ground truth. It is, however, sensible to ask for fairness for large structured subsets of individuals: so long as these subsets have a bounded VC dimension, the statistical problem of learning and auditing fair classifiers is easy, so long as the dataset is sufficiently large. This can be viewed as an interpolation between equal opportunity fairness and the individual "weakly meritocratic" fairness definition from Joseph et al. [2016] , that does not require making any assumptions about the ground truth. Our investigation focuses on the computational challenges, both in theory and in practice.
Our Results
Briefly, our contributions are:
• Formalization of the problem of auditing and learning classifiers for fairness with respect to rich classes of subgroups G.
• Results proving (under certain assumptions) the computational equivalence of auditing G and (weak) agnostic learning of G. While these results imply theoretical intractability of auditing for some natural classes G, they also suggest that practical machine learning heuristics can be applied to the auditing problem.
• Provably convergent algorithms for learning classifiers that are fair with respect to G, based on a formulation as a two-player zero-sum game between a Learner (the primal player) and an Auditor (the dual player). We provide two different algorithms, both of which are based on solving for the equilibrium of this game. The first provably converges in a polynomial number of steps and is based on simulation of the game dynamics when the Learner uses Follow the Perturbed Leader and the Auditor uses best response; the second is only guaranteed to converge asympotically but is computationally simpler, and involves both players using Fictitious Play.
• An implementation and extensive empirical evaluation of the Fictitious Play algorithm demonstrating its effectiveness on a real dataset in which subgroup fairness is a concern.
In more detail, we start by studying the computational challenge of simply checking whether a given classifier satisfies equal opportunity and statistical parity. Doing this in time linear in the number of protected groups is simple: for each protected group, we need only estimate a single expectation. However, when there are many different protected attributes which can be combined to define the protected groups, their number is combinatorially large 2 . 1 It also asks for equalized false negative rates, and that the false positive rate is smaller than the true positive rate. Here, the randomness in the "rates" is taken entirely over the randomness of the classifier. 2 For example, as discussed in a recent Propublica investigation [Angwin and Grassegger, 2017] , Facebook policy protects groups against hate speech if the group is definable as a conjunction of protected attributes. Under the Facebook schema, "race" and "gender" are both protected attributes, and so the Facebook policy protects "black women" as a distinct class, separately from black people and women. When there are d protected attributes, there are 2 d protected groups. As a statistical estimation problem, this is not a large obstacle -we can estimate 2 d expectations to error ε so long as our data set has size O(d/ε 2 ), but there is now a computational problem.
We model the problem by specifying a class of functions G defined over a set of d protected attributes. G defines a set of protected subgroups. Each function g ∈ G corresponds to the protected subgroup {x : g i (x) = 1} 3 . The first result of this paper is that for both equal opportunity and statistical parity, the computational problem of checking whether a classifier or decisionmaking algorithm D violates statistical fairness with respect to the set of protected groups G is equivalent to the problem of agnostically learning G [Kearns et al., 1994] , in a strong and distribution-specific sense. This equivalence has two implications:
1. First, it allows us to import computational hardness results from the learning theory literature. Agnostic learning turns out to be computationally hard in the worst case, even for extremely simple classes of functions G (like boolean conjunctions and linear threshold functions). As a result, we can conclude that auditing a classifier D for statistical fairness violations with respect to a class G is also computationally hard. This means we should not expect to find a polynomial time algorithm that is always guaranteed to solve the auditing problem.
2. However, in practice, various learning heuristics (like boosting, logistic regression, SVMs, backpropagation for neural networks, etc.) are commonly used to learn accurate classifiers which are known to be hard to learn in the worst case. The equivalence we show between agnostic learning and auditing is distribution specific -that is, if on a particular data set, a heuristic learning algorithm can solve the agnostic learning problem (on an appropriately defined subset of the data), it can be used also to solve the auditing problem on the same data set.
These results appear in Section 3. Next, we consider the problem of learning a classifier that equalizes false positive or negative rates across all (possibly infinitely many) sub-groups, defined by a class of functions G. As per the reductions described above, this problem is computationally hard in the worst case.
However, under the assumption that we have an efficient oracles which solves the agnostic learning problem, we give and analyze algorithms for this problem based on a game-theoretic formulation. We first prove that the optimal fair classifier can be found as the equilibrium of a two-player, zero-sum game, in which the (pure) strategy space of the "Learner" player corresponds to classifiers in H, and the (pure) strategy space of the "Auditor" player corresponds to subgroups defined by G. The best response problems for the two players correspond to agnostic learning and auditing, respectively. We show that both problems can be solved with a single call to a cost sensitive classification oracle, which is equivalent to an agnostic learning oracle. We then draw on extant theory for learning in games and no-regret algorithms to derive two different algorithms based on simulating game play in this formulation. In the first, the Learner employs the well-studied Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL) algorithm on an appropriate linearization of its best-response problem, while the Auditor approximately best-responds to the distribution over classifiers of the Learner at each step. Since FTPL has a no-regret guarantee, we obtain an algorithm that provably converges in a polynomial number of steps.
While it enjoys strong provable guarantees, this first algorithm is randomized (due to the noise added by FTPL), and the best-response step for the Auditor is polynomial time but computationally expensive. We thus propose a second algorithm that is deterministic, simpler and faster per step, based on both players adopting the Fictitious Play learning dynamic. This algorithm has weaker theoretical guarantees: it has provable convergence only asymptotically, and not in a polynomial number of steps -but is more practical and converges rapidly in practice. The derivation of these algorithms (and their guarantees) appear in Section 4.
Finally, we implement the Fictitious Play algorithm and demonstrate its practicality by efficiently learning classifiers that approximately equalize false positive rates across any group definable by a linear threshold function on 18 protected attributes in the "Communities and Crime" dataset. We use simple, fast regression algorithms as heuristics to implement agnostic learning oracles, and (via our reduction from agnostic learning to auditing) auditing oracles. Our results suggest that it is possible in practice to learn fair classifiers with respect to a large class of subgroups that still achieve non-trivial error. We also implement the algorithm of Agarwal et al. [2017] to learn a classifier that approximately equalizes false positive rates on the same dataset on the 36 groups defined just by the 18 individual protected attributes. We then audit this learned classifier with respect to all linear threshold functions on the 18 protected attributes, and find a subgroup on which the fairness constraint is substantially violated, despite fairness being achieved on all marginal attributes. This shows that phenomenon like Example 1.1 can arise in real learning problems. Full details are contained in Section 5.
Further Related Work
Independent of our work, Hébert-Johnson et al. [2017] also consider a related and complimentary notion of fairness that they call "multicalibration". In settings in which one wishes to train a real-valued predictor, multicalibration can be considered the "calibration" analogue for the definitions of subgroup fairness that we give for false positive rates, false negative rates, and classification rates. For a real-valued predictor, calibration informally requires that for every value v ∈ [0, 1] predicted by an algorithm, the fraction of individuals who truly have a positive label in the subset of individuals on which the algorithm predicted v should be approximately equal to v. Multicalibration asks for approximate calibration on every set defined implicitly by some circuit in a set G. Hébert-Johnson et al. [2017] give an algorithmic result that is analogous to the one we give for learning subgroup fair classifiers: a polynomial time algorithm for learning a multi-calibrated predictor, given an agnostic learning algorithm for G. In addition to giving a polynomial-time algorithm, we also give a practical variant of our algorithm (which is however only guaranteed to converge in the limit) that we use to conduct empirical experiments on real data.
Thematically, the most closely related piece of prior work is Zhang and Neill [2016] , who also aim to audit classification algorithms for discrimination in subgroups that have not been pre-defined. Our work differs from theirs in a number of important ways. First, we audit the algorithm for common measures of statistical unfairness, whereas Zhang and Neill [2016] design a new measure compatible with their particular algorithmic technique. Second, we give a formal analysis of our algorithm. Finally, we audit with respect to subgroups defined by a class of functions G, which we can take to have bounded VC dimension, which allows us to give formal out-of-sample guarantees. Zhang and Neill [2016] attempt to audit with respect to all possible sub-groups, which introduces a severe multiple-hypothesis testing problem, and risks overfitting. Most importantly we give actionable algorithms for learning subgroup fair classifiers, whereas Zhang and Neill [2016] restrict attention to auditing.
Technically, the most closely related piece of work (and from which we take inspiration for our algorithm in Section 4) is Agarwal et al. [2017] , who show that given access to an agnostic learning oracle for a class H, there is an efficient algorithm to find the lowest-error distribution over classifiers in H subject to equalizing false positive rates across polynomially many subgroups. Their algorithm can be viewed as solving the same zero-sum game that we solve, but in which the "subgroup" player plays gradient descent over his pure strategies, one for each sub-group. This ceases to be an efficient or practical algorithm when the number of subgroups is large, as is our case. Our main insight is that an auditing algorithm (which we show can also be implemented using an agnostic learning oracle) is sufficient to have the dual player play "fictitious play", which is a dynamic also known to converge to Nash equilibrium.
There is also other work showing computational hardness for fair learning problems. Most notably, Woodworth et al. [2017] show that finding a linear threshold classifier that approximately minimizes hinge loss subject to equalizing false positive rates across populations is computationally hard (assuming that refuting a random k-XOR formula is hard). In contrast, we show that even checking whether a classifier satisfies a false positive rate constraint on a particular data set is computationally hard (if the number of subgroups on which fairness is desired is too large to enumerate).
Model and Preliminaries
We model each individual as being described by a tuple ((x, x ), y), where x ∈ X denotes a vector of protected attributes, x ∈ X denotes a vector of unprotected attributes, and y ∈ {0, 1} denotes a label. Note that in our formulation, an auditing algorithm not only may not see the unprotected attributes x , it may not even be aware of their existence. For example, x may represent proprietary features or consumer data purchased by a credit scoring company.
We will write X = (x, x ) to denote the joint feature vector. We assume that points (X, y) are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution P . Let D be a decision making algorithm, and let D(X) denote the (possibly randomized) decision induced by D on individual (X, y). We restrict attention in this paper to the case in which D makes a binary classification decision: D(X) ∈ {0, 1}. Thus we alternately refer to D as a classifier. When auditing a fixed classifier D, it will be helpful to make reference to the distribution over examples (X, y) together with their induced classification D(X). Let P audit (D) denote the induced target joint distribution over the tuple (x, y, D(X)) that results from sampling (x, x , y) ∼ P , and providing x, the true label y, and the classification D(X) = D(x, x ) but not the unprotected attributes x . Note that the randomness here is over both the randomness of P , and the potential randomness of the classifier D.
We will be concerned with learning and auditing classifiers D satisfying two common statistical fairness constraints: equality of classification rates (also known as statistical parity), and equality of false positive rates (also known as equal opportunity). Auditing for equality of false negative rates is symmetric and so we do not explicitly consider it. Each fairness constraint is defined with respect to a set of protected groups. We define sets of protected groups via a family of indicator functions G for those groups, defined over protected attributes. Each g : X → {0, 1} ∈ G has the semantics that g(x) = 1 indicates that an individual with protected features x is in group g.
Definition 2.1 (Statistical Parity (SP) Subgroup Fairness). Fix any classifier D, distribution P , collection of group indicators G, and parameters α, β ∈ [0, 1]. We say that D satisfies (α, β)-statistical parity (SP) Fairness with respect to P and G if for every g ∈ G such that min (Pr[g(x) = 1], Pr[g(x) 
We will sometimes refer to the SP base rate, which we write as
Remark 2.2. Note that our definition has two approximation parameters, both of which are important. We are not required to be "fair" to a group g if it (or its complement) represent only a small fraction of the total probability mass. The parameter α governs how "small" a fraction of the population we are allowed to ignore. Similarly, we do not require that the probability of a positive classification in every subgroup is exactly equal to the base rate, but instead allow deviations of magnitude β. Both of these approximation parameters are important from a statistical estimation perspective. We can never hope from a finite sample of data to precisely estimate any of the probabilities made reference to in the definition of statistical parity fairness -we can only hope to estimate them up to some finite precision β. Moreover, in order to obtain reasonable statistical estimates of the classification probability on a group g, we need sufficiently many samples of members of that group, which will be impossible if α can be taken to be 0. We will sometimes refer to FP-base rate, which we write as
Remark 2.4. This definition is symmetric to the definition of statistical parity fairness, except that the α parameter is now used to exclude groups g such that negative examples (y = 0) from those g (or its complement) have probability mass less than α. This is again necessary from a statistical perspective: we cannot accurately estimate false positive rates on a group g without having observed sufficiently many negative examples from that group.
For both statistical parity and false positive fairness, if the algorithm D fails to satisfy the (α, β)-fairness condition, then we say that D is (α, β)-unfair for either statistical parity or false positive rates, with respect to P and G. We call any subgroup g which witnesses this unfairness an (α, β)-unfair certificate for (D, P ).
An auditing algorithm for a notion of fairness is given sample access to P audit (D) for some classifier D. It will either deem D to be fair with respect to P , or will else produce a certificate of unfairness.
Definition 2.5 (Auditing). Fix a notion of fairness (either statistical parity or false-positive fairness), a collection of group indicators G over the protected features, and any α, β, α , β ∈ (0, 1] such that α ≤ α and β ≤ β. A collection of classifiers H is (α, β, α , β )-(efficiently) auditable under distribution P with respect to G if there exists an (efficient) auditing algorithm A such that for every classifier D ∈ H, when given access the distribution P audit (D), A runs in time poly(1/α, 1/α , 1/β, 1/β , 1/δ) and with probability (1 − δ), outputs an (α , β )-unfair certificate for D whenever D is (α, β)-unfair with respect to P and G.
As we will show, our definition of auditing is closely related to weak agnostic learning.
Definition 2.6 (Weak Agnostic Learning , Kalai et al., 2008 ). Let Q be a distribution over X × {0, 1} and let ε, γ ∈ (0, 1/2) such that ε ≥ γ. We say that the function class G is (ε, γ)-weakly agnostically learnable under distribution Q if there exists an algorithm L such that when given sample access to Q, L runs in time poly(1/γ, 1/δ), and with probability 1 − δ, outputs a hypothesis h ∈ G such that
Cost-Sensitive Classification. In this paper, we will also give reductions to cost-sensitive classification (CSC) problems. Formally, an instance of a CSC problem for the class H is given by a set of n tuples {(X i , c 0 i , c 1 i )} n i=1 such that c i corresponds to the cost for predicting label on point X i . Given such an instance as input, a CSC oracle finds a hypothesisĥ ∈ H that minimizes the total cost across all points:
A crucial property of a CSC problem is that the solution is invariant to translations of the costs.
} be a set of new costs such that there exist a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ∈ R such thatc i = c i + a i for all i and . Then
Remark 2.8. We note that cost-sensitive classification is polynomially equivalent to agnostic learning. Hence, all of our reductions to cost-sensitive classification could be phrased as reductions to agnostic learning oracles -cost-sensitive classification is simply a more convenient representation. To see this, note that in the one direction, cost-sensitive classification is a generalization of the agnostic learning problem -in the standard agnostic learning problem, the cost of a misclassification is 1, and the cost of a correct classification is 0. In the reverse direction, note that by claim 2.7, we can always without loss of generality translate costs so that the cost of correct classification is 0. After this translation, we simply have a weighted agnostic learning problem, in which misclassifying certain points is more expensive than misclassifying others. By viewing this reweighting as defining a distribution over data points, and then solving the agnostic learning problem over this distribution, we solve the original cost-sensitive classification problem.
Follow the Perturbed Leader. We will make use of the Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL)
algorithm as a no-regret learner for online linear optimization problems [Kalai and Vempala, 2005] . To formalize the algorithm, consider S ⊂ {0, 1} d to be a set of "actions" for a learner in an online decision problem. The learner interacts with an adversary over T rounds, and in each round t, the learner (randomly) chooses some action a t ∈ S, and the adversary chooses a loss vector t ∈ [−M, M] d . The learner incurs a loss of t , a t at round t. FTPL is a simple algorithm that in each round perturbs the cumulative loss vector over the previous rounds = s<t s , and chooses the action that minimizes loss with respect to the perturbed cumulative loss vector. We present the full algorithm in Algorithm 1, and its formal guarantee in Theorem 2.9.
Algorithm 1 Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL) Algorithm
, D U be the uniform distribution over [0, 1] d , and let a 1 ∈ S be arbitrary.
For t = 1, . . . , T : Play action a t ; Observe loss vector t and suffer loss t , a t . Update:
where ξ t is drawn independently for each t from the distribution D U .
Theorem 2.9 (Kalai and Vempala [2005] ). For any sequence of loss vectors 1 , . . . , T , the FTPL algorithm has regret
where the randomness is taken over the perturbations ξ t across rounds.
Generalization Error
In this section, we observe that the error rate of a classifier D, as well as the degree to which it violates (α, β)-fairness (for both statistical parity and false positive rates) can be accurately approximated with the empirical estimates for these quantities on a dataset (drawn i.i.d. from the underlying distribution P ) so long as the dataset is sufficiently large. Once we establish this fact, since our main interest is in the computational problem of auditing and learning, in the rest of the paper, we assume that we have direct access to the underlying distribution (or equivalently, that the empirical data defines the distribution of interest), and do not make further reference to sample complexity or overfitting issues. A standard VC dimension bound (see, e.g. Kearns and Vazirani [1994] ) states:
Theorem 2.10. Fix a class of functions H. For any distribution P , let S ∼ P m be a dataset consisting of m examples (X i , y i ) sampled i.i.d. from P . Then for any 0 < δ < 1, with probability 1 − δ, for every h ∈ H, we have:
The above theorem implies that so long as m ≥Õ(VCDIM(H)/ε 2 ), then minimizing error over the empirical sample S suffices to minimize error up to an additive ε term on the true distribution P . Below, we give two analogous statements for fairness constraints:
Theorem 2.11 (SP Uniform Convergence). Fix a class of functions H and a class of group indicators G. For any distribution P , let S ∼ P m be a dataset consisting of m examples (X i , y i ) sampled i.i.d. from P . Then for any 0 < δ < 1, with probability 1 − δ, for every h ∈ H and g ∈ G with Pr (X,y)∼P [g(x) = 1] ≥ α, we have:
Theorem 2.12 (FP Uniform Convergence). Fix a class of functions H and a class of group indicators G. For any distribution P , let S ∼ P m be a dataset consisting of m examples (X i , y i ) sampled i.i.d. from P . Then for any 0 < δ < 1, with probability 1 − δ, for every h ∈ H and g ∈ G with Pr (X,y)∼P [g(x) = 1, y = 0] ≥ α, we have:
These theorems together imply that for both statistical parity and false positive rate fairness, the degree to which a group g violates the constraint of (α, β) fairness can be estimated up to error ε, so long as m ≥Õ((VCDIM(H) + VCDIM(G))/(αε) 2 ). The proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Equivalence of Auditing and Weak Agnostic Learning
In this section, we give a reduction from the problem of auditing both statistical parity and false positive rate fairness, to the problem of agnostic learning, and vice versa. This has two implications. The main implication is that, from a worst-case analysis point of view, auditing is computationally hard in almost every case (since it inherits this pessimistic state of affairs from agnostic learning). However, worst-case hardness results in learning theory have not prevented the successful practice of machine learning, and there are many heuristic algorithms that in real-world cases successfully solve "hard" agnostic learning problems. Our reductions also imply that these heuristics can be used successfully as auditing algorithms, and we exploit this in the development of our algorithmic results and their experimental evaluation.
We make the following mild assumption on the class of group indicators G, to aid in our reductions. It is satisfied by most natural classes of functions, but is in any case essentially without loss of generality (since learning negated functions can be simulated by learning the original function class on a dataset with flipped class labels).
Assumption 3.1. We assume the set of group indicators G satisfies closure under negation: for any g ∈ G, we also have ¬g ∈ G.
Recalling that X = (x, x ), the following two distributions will be useful for describing our results:
• P D : the marginal distribution on (x, D(X)).
• P D y=0 : the conditional distribution on (x, D(X)), conditioned on y = 0. We will think about these as the target distributions for a learning problem: i.e. the problem of learning to predict D(X) from only the protected features x. We will relate the ability to agnostically learn on these distributions, to the ability to audit D given access to the original distribution P audit (D).
Statistical Parity Fairness
We give our reduction first for statistical parity fairness. The reduction for false positive rate fairness will follow as a corollary, since auditing for false positive rate fairness can be viewed as auditing for statistical parity fairness on the subset of the data restricted to y = 0.
Theorem 3.2. Fix any distribution P over individual data points, any set of group indicators G, and any classifier D. Suppose that the (statistical parity) base rate b SP (D, P ) = 1/2. Then for any α, β, γ > 0, the following two relationships hold:
• If G is (αβ, γ)-weakly agnostically learnable under distribution P D , then D is (α, β, γ, γ)auditable for statistical parity fairness under P with respect to G.
We will prove Theorem 3.2 in two steps. First, we show that any unfair certificate f for D has non-trivial error for predicting the decision made by D from the sensitive attributes.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose that the base rate b SP (D, P ) ≤ 1/2 and there exists a function f such that
In the first case, we know Pr
In the second case, we have Pr[D(X) 
We can then bound
In both cases, we have (1−2b) ≥ 0 by our assumption on the base rate. Since α ∈ [0, 1], we know
In the next step, we show that if there exists any function f that accurately predicts the decisions made by the algorithm D, then either f or ¬f can serve as an unfairness certificate for D.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose that the base rate b SP (D, P ) ≥ 1/2 and there exists a function f such that Pr[D(X) = f (x)] ≥ b SP (D, P ) + γ for some value γ ∈ (0, 1/2). Then there exists a function g such that
Proof. Again recall that
Proof of Theorem 3.2. Suppose that the class G satisfies min f ∈G err(f , P D ) ≤ 1/2 − γ. Then by Lemma 3.4, there exists some g ∈ G such that Pr[g(x) 
By the assumption of auditability, we can then use the auditing algorithm to find a group g ∈ G that is an (α , β )-unfair certificate of D. By Lemma 3.3, we know that either g or ¬g predicts D with an accuracy of at least 1/2 + α β .
In the reverse direction, consider the auditing problem on the classifier D. We can treat each pair (x, D(X)) as a labelled example and learn a hypothesis in G that approximates the decisions made by D. Suppose that D is (α, β)-unfair. Then by Lemma 3.3, we know that there exists some g ∈ G such that Pr[D(X) = g(x)] ≥ 1/2 + αβ. Therefore, the weak agnostic learning algorithm from the hypothesis of the theorem will return some g with Pr[D(X) = g (x)] ≥ 1/2 + γ. By Lemma 3.4, we know g or ¬g is a (γ, γ)-unfair certificate for D.
Remark 3.5. The assumption in Theorem 3.2 that the base rate is exactly 1/2 can be relaxed. In the appendix, we extend the result by showing that our reduction holds as long as the base rate by b SP lies in the interval [1/2 − ε, 1/2 + ε] for sufficiently small ε.
False Positive Fairness
A corollary of the above reduction is an analogous equivalence between auditing for falsepositive fairness and agnostic learning. This is because a false-positive fairness constraint can be viewed as a statistical parity fairness constraint on the subset of the data such that y = 0. Therefore, Theorem 3.2 implies the following:
Corollary 3.6. Fix any distribution P over individual data points, any set of group indicators G, and any classifier D. Suppose that the (false-positive) base rate b FP (D, P ) = 1/2. The following two relationships hold:
auditable for false-positive fairness under distribution P and group indicator set G.
Worst-Case Intractability of Auditing
While we shall see in subsequent sections that the equivalence given above has positive algorithmic and experimental consequences, from a purely theoretical perspective the reduction of agnostic learning to auditing has strong negative worst-case implications. More precisely, we can import a long sequence of formal intractability results for agnostic learning to obtain:
Theorem 3.7. Under standard complexity-theoretic intractability assumptions, for G the classes of conjunctions of boolean attributes, linear threshold functions, or bounded-degree polynomial threshold functions, there exist distributions P such that the auditing problem cannot be solved in polynomial time, for either statistical parity or false positive fairness.
The proof of this theorem follows from Theorem 3.2, Corollary 3.6, and the following negative results from the learning theory literature. Feldman et al. [2012] show a strong negative result for weak agnostic learning for conjunctions: given a distribution on labeled examples from the hypercube such that there exists a monomial (or conjunction) consistent with (1−ε)-fraction of the examples, it is NP-hard to find a halfspace that is correct on (1/2 + ε)-fraction of the examples, for arbitrary constant ε > 0. Diakonikolas et al. [2011] show that under the Unique Games Conjecture, no polynomial-time algorithm can find a degree-d polynomial threshold function (PTF) that is consistent with (1/2 + ε) fraction of a given set of labeled examples, even if there exists a degree-d PTF that is consistent with a (1 − ε) fraction of the examples. Diakonikolas et al. [2011] also show that it is NP-Hard to find a degree-2 PTF that is consistent with a (1/2 + ε) fraction of a given set of labeled examples, even if there exists a halfspace (degree-1 PTF) that is consistent with a (1 − ε) fraction of the examples.
While Theorem 3.7 shows that certain natural subgroup classes G yield intractable auditing problems in the worst case, in the rest of the paper we demonstrate that effective heuristics for this problem on specific (non-worst case) distributions can be used to derive an effective and practical learning algorithm for subgroup fairness.
A Learning Algorithm Subject to Fairness Constraints G
In this section, we present two algorithms for training a (randomized) classifier that satisfies false-positive subgroup fairness simultaneously for all protected subgroups specified by a family of group indicator functions G. All of our techniques also apply to a statistical parity or false negative rate constraint.
Let S denote a set of n labeled examples
, and let P denote the empirical distribution over this set of examples. Let H be a hypothesis class defined over both the protected and unprotected attributes, and let G be a collection of group indicators over the protected attributes. We assume that H contains a constant classifier (which implies that there is at least one fair classifier to be found, for any distribution).
Our goal will be to find the distribution over classifiers from H that minimizes classification error subject to the fairness constraint over G. We will design an iterative algorithm that when given access to a CSC oracle computes an optimal randomized classifier in polynomial time. It will be useful to have notation for the false positive rate of a fixed classifier h on a group g:
and for the overall false-positive rate of h (over all groups g): (2)
Observe that this is a linear program (with one variable for every classifier h ∈ H), and that the LP is feasible: the constant classifiers that labels all points 1 or 0 satisfy all subgroup fairness constraints. Note that at the moment, the LP may be infinite dimensional (if H is an infinite hypothesis class), but we will address this momentarily.
Assumption 4.1. We assume our algorithm has access to the cost-sensitive classication oracles CSC(H) and CSC(G) over the classes H and G α respectively.
Overview of our solution. We design two algorithms to solve the above Fair ERM linear program via the following steps:
1. First, we rewrite the Fair ERM LP so that it is finite dimensional even when H is infinite.
To do this, we take advantage of the fact that Sauer's Lemma lets us bound the number of labellings that any hypothesis class H of bounded VC-dimension can induce on any fixed dataset. The re-written LP has one variable for each of these possible labellings, rather than one variable for each hypothesis. Moreover, it has one constraint for each of the finitely many possible subgroups induced by G α on the fixed dataset, rather than one for each of the (possibly infinitely many) subgroups definable over arbitrary datasets. This step is important -it will both guarantee that strong duality holds, and allow us to give polynomial time convergence bounds. 2. We then derive the partial Lagrangian of the rewritten Fair ERM LP, and note that computing an approximately optimal solution to this LP is equivalent to finding an approximate minmax solution for a corresponding zero-sum game, in which the objective function is the value of the Lagrangian. The actions of the primal or "Learner" player correspond to classifiers h ∈ H, and the actions of the dual or "Auditor" player correspond to subgroups g ∈ G α . 3. In order to reason about convergence, we restrict the set of dual variables to lie in a bounded set: a scaling of the probability simplex. In particular, it is useful in the analysis to view the set of vertices in the simplex as a finite set of pure strategies for the Auditor player. We show that as a function of the restriction we choose, the approximate minmax solution of the constrained game continues to give an approximately optimal solution to the fair ERM problem. 4. We observe that given a mixed strategy for the Auditor, the best response problem of the Learner corresponds to an cost-sensitive classification problem. Similarly, given a mixed strategy for the Learner, the best response problem of the Auditor corresponds to an auditing problem (which can be represented as a cost-sensitive classification problem). Hence, if we have oracles for solving cost-sensitive classification problems, we can compute best responses for both players, in response to arbitrary mixed strategies of their opponents. 5. Finally, we show that the ability to compute best responses for each player is sufficient to implement two different dynamics known to converge to equilibrium in zero sum games.
The first dynamic we study involves having the Learner play Follow the Perturbed Leader, which is a no-regret algorithm, against an Auditor who at every round best responds to the learner's mixed strategy. In order to implement this in polynomial time, we need to represent the loss of the learner as a low-dimensional linear optimization problem, which we do by defining an appropriately translated cost-sensitive classification problem. This dynamic provably converges to an approximately optimal solution in a polynomial number of rounds. We then give a Fictitious Play dynamic, in which both players repeatedly best respond to the mixed strategy corresponding to the empirical play history of their opponent. In zero-sum games, Fictitious Play dynamics are known to converge to Nash equilibrium, albeit not in a polynomial number of rounds. However, we give this algorithm as well because it is much more practical to implement per-step. This is the algorithm we use in our experiments, which show that it converges quickly on real data.
Rewriting the Fair ERM LP
To facilitate our analysis, we will rewrite our Fair ERM LP. First, note that even though both G α and H can be infinite sets, the sets of possible labellings on the data set S induced by these classes are finite. More formally, we will write G(S) and H(S) to denote the set of all labellings on S that are induced by G α and H respectively, that is
We can bound the cardinalities of G(S) and H(S) using Sauer's Lemma. Given this observation, we can then consider an equivalent optimization problem where the distribution p is over the set of labellings in H(S), and the set of subgroups are defined by the labellings in G(S). We will view each g in G(S) as a boolean function.
Next, we will rewrite the constraints in a way that allows us to reduce the problem of finding the most violated constraint to a cost-sensitive classification problem.
Then for each g ∈ G α , a distribution p over H(S) satisfies the constraints in Equations (23) and (24) if and only if Φ
For the rest of this section, we will focus on the following equivalent optimization problem.
such that for each g ∈ G(S) :
Lagrangian with Restricted Dual Space
For each pair of constraints (8) and (9), corresponding to a group g ∈ G(S), we introduce a pair of dual variables λ + g and λ − g . The partial Lagrangian of the linear program is the following:
By Sion's minmax theorem [Sion, 1958] , we have where OPT denotes the optimal objective value in the fair ERM problem. Similarly, the distribution arg min p max λ L(p, λ) corresponds to an optimal feasible solution to the fair ERM linear program. Thus, finding an optimal solution for the fair ERM problem reduces to computing a minmax solution for the Lagrangian. Our algorithms will both compute such a minmax solution by iteratively optimizing over both the primal variables p and dual variables λ. In order to guarantee convergence in our optimization, we will restrict the dual space to the following bounded set:
where C will be a parameter of our algorithm. Since Λ is a compact and convex set, the minmax condition continues to hold [Sion, 1958] :
If we knew an upper bound C on the 1 norm of the optimal dual solution, then this restriction on the dual solution would not change the minmax solution of the program. We do not in general know such a bound. However, we now show that even though we restrict the dual variables to lie in a bounded set, any approximate minmax solution to Equation (10) is also an approximately optimal and approximately feasible solution to the original fair ERM problem. Then err(p, P ) ≤ OPT +2ν and for any g ∈ G(S), Φ − (p, g), Φ + (p, g) ≤ 1+2ν
C . Before we prove Theorem 4.4, we will characterize the solution for the maximization problem over λ.
Note that this is a linear optimization problem over the non-negative orthant of a scaling of the 1 ball, and so has a solution at a vertex, which corresponds to a single group g ∈ G(S). Thus, there is always a best response λ that puts all the weight C on the coordinate (λ ) • g that maximizes Φ • (p, g).
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Let p * be the optimal feasible solution for our constrained optimization problem. Since p * is feasible, we know that L(p * ,λ) ≤ err(p * , P ).
We will first focus on the case wherep is not a feasible solution, that is
Let (ĝ,•) ∈ argmax (g,•) Φ • (p, g) and let λ ∈ Λ be a vector with (λ )•ĝ = C and all other coordinates zero. By Lemma 4.5, we know that λ ∈ argmax λ∈Λ L(p, λ). By the definition of a ν-approximate minmax solution, we know that L(p,λ) ≥ L(p, λ ) − ν. This implies that
Note that L(p * ,λ) ≤ err(p * , P ), and so
Combining Equations (11) and (12), we get
Note that C Φ•(p,ĝ) ≥ 0, so we must have err(p, P ) ≤ err(p * , P ) + 2ν = OPT +2ν. Furthermore, since err(p, P ), err(p * , P ) ∈ [0, 1], we know which implies that maximum constraint violation satisfies Φ•(p,ĝ) ≤ (1 + 2ν)/C. Now let us consider the case in whichp is a feasible solution for the optimization problem. Then it follows that there is no constraint violation byp and max λ L(p, λ) = err(p, P ), and so err(p, P ) = max λ L(p, λ) ≤ L(p,λ) + ν ≤ min p L(p,λ) + 2ν ≤ L(p * ,λ) + 2ν ≤ err(p * , P ) + 2ν Therefore, the stated bounds hold for both cases.
Zero-Sum Game Formulation
To compute an approximate minmax solution, we will first view Equation (10) as the following two player zero-sum matrix game. The Learner (or the minimization player) has pure strategies corresponding to H, and the Auditor (or the maximization player) has pure strategies corresponding to the set of vertices Λ pure in Λ -more precisely, each vertex or pure strategy either is the all zero vector or consists of a choice of a g ∈ G(S), along with the sign + or − that the corresponding g-fairness constraint will have in the Lagrangian. More formally, we write
Even though the number of pure strategies scales linearly with |G(S)|, our algorithm will never need to actually represent such vectors explicitly. Note that any vector in Λ can be written as a convex combination of the maximization player's pure strategies, or in other words: as a mixed strategy for the Auditor. For any pair of actions (h, λ) ∈ H × Λ pure , the payoff is defined as
Claim 4.6. Let p ∈ ∆ H(S) and λ ∈ Λ such that (p, λ) is a ν-approximate minmax equilibrium in the zero-sum game defined above. Then (p, λ) is also a ν-approximate minmax solution for Equation (10).
Our problem reduces to finding an approximate equilibrium for this game. Both of our algorithms will crucially require the ability to compute best responses for both players in the game. We now show that the problem of computing best responses for both players can be solved by the cost-sensitive classication oracles.
Learner's best response. Fix any mixed strategy (dual solution) λ ∈ Λ of the Auditor. The Learner's best response is given by:
Note that it suffices for the Learner to optimize over deterministic classifiers h ∈ H, rather than distributions over classifiers. This is because the Learner is solving a linear optimization problem over the simplex, and so always has an optimal solution at a vertex (i.e. a single classifier h ∈ H). We can reduce this problem to one that can be solved with a single call to a cost-sensitive classification oracle. In particular, we can assign costs to each example (X i , y i ) as follows:
• if y i = 1, then c 0 i = 0 and c 1 i = − 1 n ; • otherwise, c 0 i = 0 and
Given a fixed set of dual variables λ, we will write LC(λ) ∈ R n to denote the vector of costs for labelling each datapoint as 1. That is, LC(λ) is the vector such that for any i ∈ [n], LC(λ) i = c 1 i Remark 4.7. Note that in defining the costs above, we have translated them from their most natural values so that the cost of labeling any example with 0 is 0. In doing so, we recall that by Claim 2.7, the solution to a cost-sensitive classification problem is invariant to translation. As we will see, this will allow us to formulate the learner's optimization problem as a low-dimensional linear optimization problem, which will be important for an efficient implementation of follow the perturbed leader. In particular, if we find a hypothesis that produces the n labels y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) for the n points in our dataset, then the cost of this labelling in the cost-sensitive classification problem is by construction LC(λ), y .
Auditor's best response. Fix any mixed strategy (primal solution) p ∈ ∆ H(S) of the Learner.
The Auditor's best response is given by:
To find the best response, consider the problem of computing (ĝ,•) = argmax (g,•) Φ • (p, g). There are two cases. In the first case, p is a strictly feasible primal solution: that is Φ•(p,ĝ) < 0. In this case, the solution to (29) sets λ = 0. Otherwise, if p is not strictly feasible, then by Lemma 4.5 the best response is to set λ•ĝ = C (and all other coordinates to 0). Therefore, it suffices to solve for argmax (g,•) Φ • (p, g). We proceed by solving argmax g Φ + (p, g) and argmax g Φ − (p, g) separately: both problems can be reduced to a cost-sensitive classification problem. To solve for argmax g Φ + (p, g) with a CSC oracle, we assign costs to each example (X i , y i ) as follows:
• if y i = 1, then c 0 i = 0 and c 1 i = 0; • otherwise, c 0 i = 0 and
To solve for argmax g Φ − (p, g) with a CSC oracle, we assign the same costs to each example (X i , y i ), except when y i = 0, labeling "1" incurs a cost of
Solving the Game with No-Regret Dynamics
To compute an approximate equilibrium of the zero-sum game, we will simulate the following no-regret dynamics between the Learner and the Auditor over rounds: over each of the T rounds, the Learner plays a distribution over the hypothesis class according to a no-regret learning algorithm (Follow the Perturbed Leader), and the Auditor plays an approximate best response against the Learner's distribution for that round. By the result of Freund and Schapire [1996] , the average plays of both players over time converge to an approximate equilibrium of the game, as long as the Learner has low regret.
Theorem 4.8 (Freund and Schapire [1996] ). Let p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p T ∈ ∆ H(S) be a sequence of distributions played by the Learner, and let λ 1 , λ 2 , . . . , λ T ∈ Λ pure be the Auditor's sequence of approximate best responses against these distributions respectively. Let p = 1 T T t=1 p t and λ = 1 T T t=1 λ t be the two players' empirical distributions over their strategies. Suppose that the regret of the Learner satisfies
Then (p, λ) is an (γ L + γ A )-approximate minimax equilibrium of the game.
Our Learner will play using the Follow the Perturbed Leader (FTPL), which gives a noregret guarantee. In order to implement FPTL, we will first need to formulate the Learner's best response problem as a linear optimization problem over a low dimensional space. For each round t, let λ t = s<t λ s be the vector representing the sum of the actions played by the auditor over previous rounds, and recall that LC(λ t ) is the cost vector given by our costsensitive classification reduction. Then the Learner's best response problem against λ t is the following linear optimization problem
To run the FTPL algorithm, the Learner will optimize a "perturbed" version of the problem above. In particular, the Learner will play a distribution p t over the hypothesis class H(S) that is implicitely defined by the following sampling operation. To sample a hypothesis h from p t , the learner solves the following randomized optimization problem:
where η is a parameter and ξ is a noise vector drawn from the uniform distribution over [0, 1] n . Note that while it is intractable to explicitly represent the distribution p t (which has support size scaling with |H(S)|), we can sample from p t efficiently given access to a cost-sensitive classification oracle for H. By instantiating the standard regret bound of FTPL for online linear optimization (Theorem 2.9), we get the following regret bound for the Learner. 
1 √ nT , and λ 1 , . . . , λ T be the sequence of plays by the Auditor. Then
To instantiate the regret bound in Theorem 2.9, we just need to provide a bound on the maximum absoluate value over the coordinates of the loss vector (the quantity M in Theorem 2.9). For any λ ∈ Λ, the absolute value of the i-th coordinate of LC(λ) is bounded by:
Also note that the dimension of the optimization is the size of the dataset n. This means if we set η = n (1+C) 1 √ nT , the regret of the learner will then be bounded by 2n 1/4 (1 + C) √
T . Now we consider how the Auditor (approximately) best responds to the distribution p t . The main obstacle is that we do not have an explicit representation for p t . Thus, our first step is to approximate p t with an explicitly represented sparse distributionp t . We do that by drawing m i.i.d. samples from p t , and taking the empirical distributionp t over the sample. The Auditor will best respond to this empirical distributionp t . To show that any best response top t is also an approximate best response to p t (Corollary 4.11) , we will rely on the following uniform convergence lemma, which allows us to bound the difference in expected payoff for any strategy of the auditor, when played against distribution p t as compared to distributionp t .
Lemma 4.10. Fix any γ, δ ∈ (0, 1) and any distribution p over H(S) . Let h 1 , . . . , h m be m i.i.d. draws from p, andp be the empirical distribution over the realized sample. Let λ ∈ Λ be arbitrary. Then with probability at least 1 − δ over the random draws of h j 's, the following holds
as long as m ≥ c 0 C 2 (ln(1/δ)+d 2 ln(n)) γ 2 for some absolute constant c 0 and d 2 = VCDIM(G).
Proof. Recall that for any distribution p over H(S) the expected payoff function is defined as
By the triangle inequality, it suffices to show that with probability (1 − δ), A = | E h∼p [err(h, P )] − E h∼p [err(h, P )] | ≤ γ/2 and for all g ∈ G(S),
The first part follows directly from a simple application of the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound (Theorem A.1): with probability (1 − δ/2), A ≤ γ/2, as long as m ≥ 2 ln(4/δ)/γ 2 . To bound the second part, we first note that by Hölder's inequality, we have
holds for all • ∈ {−, +} and g ∈ G(S). Note that
We can rewrite the absolute value of first term:
where the last inequality follows from Pr[g(x) = 1 | y = 0] ≤ 1.
Note that E h∼p [Pr[h(X) [Pr[h(X) 
In the following, we will let δ 0 = 2 exp − γ 2 m 8C 2 . Similarly, we also have for each g ∈ G(S),
By taking the union bound over (18) and (19) over all choices of g ∈ G(S), we have with probability at least (1 − δ 0 (1 + |G(S)|)), (21) Note that by Sauer's lemma (Lemma 4.2), |G(S)| ≤ O n d 2 . Thus, there exists an absolute constant c 0 such that m ≥ c 0 C 2 (ln(1/δ)+d 2 ln(n)) γ 2 implies that failure probability above δ 0 (1 + |G(S)|) ≤ δ/2. We will assume m satisifies such a bound, and so the events of (20) and (21) hold with probaility at least (1 − δ/2). Then by the triangle inequality we have for all (g,
, which in turn imples that B(g) ≤ γ/2. This completes the proof.
Corollary 4.11. Fix any γ, δ ∈ (0, 1) and any distribution p over H(S) . Let h 1 , . . . , h m be m i.i.d. draws from p, and letp be the empirical distribution over the realized sample. Let λ be the Auditor's best response againstp. Then with probability at least 1 − δ over the random draws of h j 's,
Finally, let p and λ be the average of the strategies played by the two players over the course of the dynamics. Note that p is an average of many distributions with large support, and so p itself has support size that is too large to represent explicitely. Thus, we will again approximate p with a sparse distributionp estimated from a sample drawn from p. Note that we can efficiently sample from p given access to a CSC oracle. To sample, we first uniformly randomly select a round t ∈ [T ], and then use the CSC oracle to solve the sampling problem defined in (17), with the noise random variable ξ freshly sampled from its distribution. The full algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2, and we now show that with high probability, the output pair (p, λ) is an approximate equilibrium of the zero-sum game, and thereforep yields the desired solution for the Fair ERM problem.
Algorithm 2 FairNR: Fair No-Regret Dynamics
Input: distribution P over n labelled data points, CSC oracles CSC(H) and CSC(G), dual bound C, and target accuracy parameter ν, δ Fix any ν, δ ∈ (0, 1) . Then given an input of n data points and accuracy parameters ν, δ and access to oracles CSC(H) and CSC(H), FairNR runs in polynomial time, and with probability at least 1 − δ, the distribution over classifiersp that it outputs satisfies err(p, P ) ≤ OPT +2ν, and for any g ∈ G(S), the fairness constraint violations are at most:
Proof. By Theorem 4.4, it suffices to show that with probability at least 1 − δ, (p, λ) is a νapproximate equilibrium in the zero-sum game. As a first step, we will rely on Theorem 4.8 to show that (p, λ) forms an approximate equilibrium.
By Lemma 4.9, the regret of the sequence p 1 , . . . , p T is bounded by:
By instantiating Corollary 4.11 with a failure probability of ν/3, the Auditor is performing a γ t A -approximate best response at each round t with
where c 0 is the absolute constant in Lemma 4.10 and d 2 = VCDIM(G). We can bound the Auditor's regret as follows:
Since the sequence γ t A consists of independent random variables in the range [−2C, 2C], by McDiarmid's inequality (Theorem A.2), we have with probability 1 − δ/2 that
We will condition on this upper-bound event on γ A for the rest of this proof, which is the case except with probability δ/2. By Theorem 4.8, we know that the average plays (p, λ) form an (γ L + γ A )-approximate equilibrium. By Lemma 4.10, we know that with probability at least (1 − δ/2), the pair (p, λ) form a R-approximate equilibrium, with
where δ = min{ν, δ}. Note that R ≤ ν as long as we have m ≥ 36c 0 C 2 ln(2/δ )d 2 ln(n) ν 2 and, T ≥ 144 √ n ln(2/δ)(C + 1) 2 ν 2
This completes our proof.
Solving the Game with Fictitious Play
We now give an alternative algorithm for computing an approximately optimal fair classifier. Like the algorithm given in the last section, the algorithm in this section works by simulating a game-dynamic that converges to Nash equilibrium in the zero-sum game that we derived, corresponding to the Fair ERM problem. Rather than using a no-regret dynamic, we instead use a simple iterative procedure known as Fictitious Play [Brown, 1949] . Fictitious Play dynamics has the benefit of being more practical to implement: at each round, both players simply need to compute a single best response to the empirical play of their opponents, and this optimization requires only a single call to a CSC oracle. In contrast, the FTPL dynamic we gave in the previous section requires making many calls to a CSC oracle per round -a computationally expensive process -in order to find a sparse approximation to the Learner's mixed strategy at that round. The disadvantage is that Fictitious Play is only known to converge to equilibrium in the limit, rather than in a polynomial number of rounds. Nevertheless, this is the algorithm that we use in our experiments -as we will show, it performs well on real data, despite the fact that it has weaker theoretical guarantees compared to the algorithm we presented in the last section. Fictitious play proceeds in rounds, and in every round each player chooses a best response to his opponent's empirical history of play across previous rounds, by treating it as the mixed strategy that randomizes uniformly over the empirical history. The seminal result of Robinson [1951] shows that the empirical mixed strategy of the two players converges to Nash equilibrium in any finite, bounded zero sum game.
We can now describe the full algorithm, and state a theorem regarding its convergence.
Algorithm 3 FairFictPlay: Fair Fictitious Play Input: distribution P over the labelled data points, CSC oracles CSC(H) and CSC(G) for the classes H(S) and G(S) respectively, dual bound C, and number of rounds T Initialize: set h 0 to be some classifier in H, set λ 0 to be the zero vector. Let p and λ be the point distributions that put all their mass on h 0 and λ 0 respectively. For t = 1, . . . , T : Compute the empirical play distributions: Let p be the uniform distribution over the set of classifiers {h 0 , . . . , h t−1 } Let λ = t <t λ t t be the auditor's empirical dual vector Learner best responds: Use the oracle CSC(H) to compute h t = argmin h∈H(S) LC(λ), h Auditor best responds: Use the oracle CSC(G) to compute λ t = argmax λ E h∼p [U (h, λ)] Output: the final empirical distribution p over classifiers Theorem 4.13. Fix any constant C. Suppose we run Fair Fictitious Play with dual bound C for T rounds. Then the distribution over classifiers p it outputs satisfies err(p, P ) ≤ OPT +2ν and for any g ∈ G α , the fairness constraint violations are at most:
Proof. By the result of Robinson [1951] , the output (p, λ) form a ν-approximate equilibrium of the Lagrangian game, where
Our result then directly follows from Theorem 4.4.
Remark 4.14. The theoretical convergence rate in Theorem 4.13 is quite slow, compared to the first algorithm we gave. This is because the best known convergence rate for fictitious play (proven by Robinson [1951] ) has an exponential dependence on the number of actions of each player. However, fictitious play is known to converge much more quickly in practice. In fact, Karlin's conjecture is that fictitious play enjoys a polynomial convergence rate 4 even in the worst case. We present this algorithm because it runs much more quickly per iteration, and so is more practical to run. As we show in Section 5, this algorithm converges quickly on real data.
Experimental Evaluation

Description of Data
We conclude our results with an extensive analysis of our algorithm's behavior and performance on a real data set, and a demonstration that our methods are necessary empirically to avoid fairness gerrymandering.
The dataset we use for our experimental valuation is known as the "Communities and Crime" (C&C) dataset, available at the UC Irvine Data Repository 5 . Each record in this dataset describes the aggregate demographic properties of a different U.S. community; the data combines socio-economic data from the 1990 US Census, law enforcement data from the 1990 US LEMAS survey, and crime data from the 1995 FBI UCR. The total number of records is 1994, and the number of features is 122. The variable to be predicted is the rate of violent crime in the community.
While there are larger and more recent datasets in which subgroup fairness is a potential concern, there are properties of the C&C dataset that make it particularly appealing for the initial experimental evaluation of our proposed algorithm. Foremost among these is the relatively high number of sensitive or protected attributes, and the fact that they are real-valued (since they represent aggregates in a community rather than specific individuals). This means there is a very large number of protected sub-groups that can be defined over them. There are distinct continuous features measuring the percentage or per-capita representation of multiple racial groups (including white, black, Hispanic, and Asian) in the community, each of which can vary independently of the others. Similarly, there are continuous features measuring the average per capita incomes of different racial groups in the community, as well as features measuring the percentage of each community's police force that falls in each of the racial groups. Thus restricting to features capturing race statistics and a couple of related ones (such as the percentage of residents who do not speak English well), we obtain an 18-dimensional space of real-valued protected attributes. We note that the C&C dataset has numerous other features that arguably could or should be protected as well (such as gender features), which would raise the dimensionality of the protected subgroups even further. 6 We convert the real-valued rate of violent crime in each community to a binary label indicating whether the community is in the 70th percentile of that value, indicating that it is a relatively high-crime community. Thus the strawman baseline that always predicts 0 (lower crime) has error approximately 30% or 0.3 on this classification problem. We chose the 70th percentile since it seems most natural to predict the highest crime rates. This choice also demonstrates that although our formal reductions required a 0.5 base rate, our proposed algorithm can perform well in practice without this condition.
As in the theoretical sections of the paper, our main interest and emphasis is on the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm FairFictPlay on a given dataset, including:
• Whether the algorithm in fact converges, and does so in a feasible amount of computation. Recall that formal convergence is only guaranteed under the assumption of oracles that do not exist in practice, and even then is only guaranteed asymptotically.
• Whether the randomized classifier learned by the algorithm has nontrivial accuracy, as well as strong subgroup fairness properties.
• Whether the algorithm permits nontrivial tuning of the trade-off between accuracy and subgroup fairness.
As discussed in Section 2.1, we note that all of these issues can be investigated entirely insample, without concern for generalization performance. Thus for simplicity, despite the fact that our algorithm enjoys all the usual generalization properties depending on the VC dimension of the Learner's hypothesis space and the Auditor's subgroup space (see Theorems 2.12 and 2.11), we report all results here on the full C&C dataset of 1994 points, treating it as the true distribution of interest.
Algorithm Implementation
The main details in the implementation of FairFictPlay are the identification of the model classes for Learner and Auditor, the implementation of the cost sensitive classification oracle and auditing oracle, and the identification of the protected features for Auditor. For our experiments, at each round Learner chooses a linear threshold function over all 122 features. We implement the cost sensitive classification oracle via a two stage regression procedure. In particular, the inputs to the cost sensitive classification oracle are cost vectors c 0 , c 1 , where the i th element of c k is the cost of predicting k on datapoint i. We train two linear regression models r 0 , r 1 to predict c 0 and c 1 respectively, using all 122 features. Given a new point x, we predict the cost of classifying x as 0 and 1 using our regression models: these predictions are r 0 (x) and r 1 (x) respectively. Finally we output the predictionŷ corresponding to lower predicted cost: y = argmin i∈{0,1} r i (x). Auditor's model class consists of all linear threshold functions over just the 18 aforementioned protected race-based attributes. As per the algorithm, at each iteration t Auditor attempts to find a subgroup on which the false positive rate is substantially different than the base rate, given the Learner's randomized classifier so far. We implement the auditing oracle by treating it as a weighted regression problem in which the goal is find a linear function (which will be taken to define the subgroup) that on the negative examples, can predict the Learner's probabilistic classification on each point. We use the same regression subroutine as Learner does, except that Auditor only has access to the 18 sensitive features, rather than all 122.
Recall that in addition to the choices of protected attributes and model classes for Learner and Auditor, FairFictPlay has a parameter C, which is a bound on the norm of the dual variables for Auditor (the dual player). The theory of Section 4 tells us that if C is larger than some threshold, the dual player is unconstrained and can find their optimal minmax strategy for the game, enforcing perfect subgroup fairness, with Learner achieving whatever accuracy is possible given perfect subgroup fairness.
More generally however, if C is less than the perfect subgroup fairness threshold, there is still a well-defined game in which Auditor's strategy space is constrained, and thus Auditor has less influence on the Learner's objective. Thus in theory, smaller values of C trade weaker subgroup fairness constraints for higher accuracy. More precisely, for any finite C, we know from Theorem 4.13 that at equilibrium the false-positive rate disparity of Learner's randomized classifier on any subgroup is at most on the order of 1/C, and has error at most that of the optimal perfectly fair classifier (infinite C), and possibly less due to the relaxed fairness constraints. In our experiments we therefore run FairFictPlay for a wide range of values of C (from 0 to 500, with greater resolution at smaller values due to higher sensitivity there), in the hope of sketching a Pareto curve of models giving a spectrum of empirically optimal trade-offs between accuracy and subgroup fairness.
Results
Particularly in light of the gaps between the idealized theory and the actual implementation, the most basic questions about FairFictPlay are whether it converges at all, and if so, whether it converges to "interesting" models -that is, models with both nontrivial classification error (much better than the 30% or 0.3 baserate), and nontrivial subgroup fairness (much better than ignoring fairness altogether). We shall see that at least for the C&C dataset, the answers to these questions is strongly affirmative. We begin by examining the evolution of the error of Learner's model. In the left panel of Figure 1 we show the error of the model found by Learner vs. iteration for several values of C. We see that the error is indeed converging smoothly, and furthermore that C is clearly influencing the asymptotic error as well as the rate of convergence -smaller values of C, in which the Auditor's power is more limited, lead to faster convergence to lower error. In the right panel, we zoom in on just the early iterations in order to highlight the influence of the Auditor. All values of C result in an initial model that is simply the optimal model on the data absent any fairness considerations (which is approximately 0.11). Successive iterations of the game, however, begin to impose Auditor's subgroup fairness constraints on the Learner, resulting in a rapid rise of the error. Larger values of C cause a higher and longer rise in the error before its decline to its asymptotic error. Figure 1 measures the impact of Auditor on Learner only indirectly, via the influence on the error of the model learned. In Figure 2 we more directly measure the quality and amount of fairness enforced by the Auditor for the same values of C. One natural direct measure of the Auditor's impact is to define the unfairness u(g t ) of the Learner's model H t−1 on the subgroup g t chosen by Auditor as follows: u(g t ) is the fraction of datapoints falling in g t , multiplied by the absolute difference between the FP rate of H t−1 on g t and the background FP rate. This effectively measures the Auditor's ability to find a large subgroup with high FP disparity compared to the base rate, and is analogous to the quantity αβ in the definition of (α, β)-fairness. Large values of u(g t ) mean that the Auditor has found a relatively highly discriminated subgroup with relatively large mass, whereas small values mean that the Auditor found only relatively small discrimination in a subgroup with relatively little mass. In Figure 2(a) , we show the evolution of u(g t ) for the same values of C as in Figure 1 . While not easily seen in the plot, for all values of C there is an initial spike in u(g t ), corresponding to the first models chosen by Learner obeying no or few fairness constraints. These spikes diminish rapidly as Auditor enforces fairness, and the process settles into a gradual balance between error and fairness. We also see that for smaller values of C, for which the Auditor's influence is more restricted due to the limited weights in the Lagrangian, u(g t ) is uniformly higher than for larger values of C. For all values of C, u(g t ) generally increases with t -the fairness constraints on the Learner grow with time -but appear to asymptote to values that depend on C in the expected fashion. Figures 1 and 2(a) together demonstrate that FairFictPlay does indeed learn models providing a nontrivial balance of error and subgroup fairness. For example, examining the red curves in these figures corresponding to the choice C = 105, we see that at iteration 7000, Fair-FictPlay has found a model with error approximately 0.167 (much better than the strawman error 0.3), and for which the Auditor is unable to find subgroups with unfairness above 0.02 (much lower than the unfairness being found for C = 15 at the same iteration, which is close to 0.06, or for the unconstrained model at round 1, which is roughly the same.)
While the analysis so far confirms that the Auditor indeed is enforcing fairness constraints on the Learner, it does not provide a sense of the extent to which the Auditor is finding multiple "different" subgroups over time, and is thus truly utilizing the power of its rich space of models over the restricted attributes (in contrast to the more traditional approach of ensuring fairness with respect to just one or a few pre-defined protected groups). Perhaps the most basic way of measuring the diversity of subgroups found by Auditor is to look at the actual evolution of the subgroup models -in this case, the weight vectors of the linear classifiers found. In Figure 2 (b), we show these weights over time for just the choice C = 105 (plots for other values of C are similar), and from iteration 10 to 1000 since the earliest weights are large and would dominate the scale. It is clear from this figure that the Auditor indeed explores a diverse set of linear classifiers over time, as many of the 18 protected attribute weights change sign repeatedly, a few in sometimes oscillatory fashion. But a more intuitive measure would be to simply look at how many datapoints are "touched" by the Auditor over time -that is, how many datapoints have fallen in one or more of the subgroups found by the Auditor so far, which we can view as measuring the number of "protected" datapoints. As the Auditor gradually finds more, and more diverse, subgroups to add to the Lagrangian of the Learner, this quantity should increase. We illustrate this phenomenon in Figure 2(c) , which shows the cumulative number of datapoints touched by Auditor at each iteration, again for the same selection of values of C. For all C the y value starts at 213, since the very first linear classifier found by the Auditor defines a subgroup of 213 datapoints. For the smallest value of C (C = 15), the value eventually climbs to roughly half the dataset, while for the larger values of C the entire dataset is eventually touched by the Auditor. Note that this does not indicate that fairness is obtained for every datapoint or subgroup, just that the Auditor has presented Learner with fairness constraints involving every datapoint. Note that these values are reached very early in the process (the first 30 iterations), despite the fact that the other plots clearly indicate that the balance between accuracy and fairness continues long after. We also illustrate the full spectrum of error-fairness trade-offs yielded by running FairFict-Play with values of C ranging from 0 to 500. In Figure 3(a) , each point represents both the error (x axis) and the subgroup unfairness u(g T ) at T = 7000 for varying values of C. While not all points lie exactly on the Pareto frontier due to the differences in convergence rates, a clear menu of near-optimal trade-offs emerges. We can have error near the unconstrained optimal of 0.11, and subgroup unfairness over 0.06. At the other extreme, we can have error no better than the trivial baseline of the constant classifier of 0.3, and near-zero subgroup unfairness. In between there is an appealing curve of trade-offs, but one that also cannot be escaped without enriching the model space of the Learner or the Auditor or both. Figure 3(b) shows a similar frontier, this time between error and the number of datapoints touched by Auditor as discussed above. Again we see a menu of trade-off options, from optimal error and few subgroup members, to progressively worse error and the entire population involved in audited subgroups.
It is intuitive that one can construct (as we did in the introduction) artificial examples in which classifiers which equalize false positive rates across groups defined only with respect to individual protected binary features can exhibit unfairness in more complicated subgroups. However, it might be the case that on real-world datasets, enforcing false positive rate fairness in marginal subgroups using previously known algorithms (like Agarwal et al. [2017] ) would already provide at least approximate fairness in the combinatorially many subgroups defined by a simple (e.g. linear threshold) function over the protected features. To investigate this possibility, we implemented the algorithm of Agarwal et al. [2017] , which employs a similar optimization framework. In their algorithm the "primal player" plays the same weighted classification oracle we use, and the dual player plays gradient descent over a space of dimension equal to the number of protected groups. We used the same Communities and Crime dataset with the same 18 protected features. Our 18 protected attributes are real valued. In order to come up with a small number of protected groups, we threshold each real-valued attribute at its mean, and define 36 protected groups: each one corresponding to one of the protected attributes lying either above or below its mean.
We then ran the algorithm from Agarwal et al. [2017] , using a learning rate of 1 √ t at time step t in the gradient descent step. After just 13 iterations, across all 36 protected groups defined on the single protected attributes, the false positive rate disparity was already below 0.03, and the classifier had achieved non-trivial error (not far above the unconstrained optimal), thus successfully balancing accuracy with fairness on the small number of pre-defined subgroups. However, upon auditing the resulting classifier with respect to the richer class of linear threshold functions on the continuously-valued protected features, we uncovered a large subgroup whose false positive rate differed substantially from the baseline. This subgroup had weight 0.674 (consisting of well over half of the datapoints), and a false positive rate that was higher than the base rate by 0.26 -a 61% increase. While the discriminated subgroup is of course defined by a complex linear threshold function over 18 variables, the largest weights by far were on only three of these features; the subgroup can be informally interpreted as a disjunction identifying communities where the percentage of the police forces that are Black or Hispanic are relatively high, or where the percentage that is Asian is relatively low.
This simple experiment illustrates that in practice it may be easy to learn classifiers which appear fair with respect to the marginal groups given by pre-defined protected features, but may discriminate significantly against the members of a simple combinatorial subgroup.
B Generalization Bounds
Proof of Theorems 2.11 and 2.12. We give a proof of Theorem 2.11. The proof of Theorem 2.12 is identical, as false positive rates are just positive classification rates on the subset of the data for which y = 0.
Given a set of classifiers H and protected groups G, define the following function class:
We can relate the VC-dimension of F H,G to the VC-dimension of H and G:
Proof. Let S be a set of size m shattered by F H,G . Let π F H,G (S) be the number of labelings of S realized by elements of F H,G . By the definition of shattering, π F H,G (S) = 2 m . Now for each labeling of S by an element in F H,G , it is realized as
, and so it can be realized as the conjunction of a labeling of S by an element of F and an element of G. But since there are π F (S)π G (S) such pairs of labelings, this immediately implies that π F H,G (S) ≤ π F (S)π G (S). Now by the Sauer-Shelah Lemma (see e.g. Kearns and Vazirani [1994] 
, which implies that m =Õ(VCDIM(H) + VCDIM(G)), as desired.
This bound, together with a standard VC-Dimension based uniform convergence theorem (see e.g. Kearns and Vazirani [1994] ) implies that with probability 1 − δ, for every f h,g ∈ F H,G :
The left hand side of the above inequality can be written as: We have already bounded the first term: it remains to bound the second term. Again, invoking a standard VC-dimension bound, we obtain: Proof. Suppose that the class G satisfies min f ∈G err(f , P D ) ≤ 1/2 − γ. Then by Lemma C.2, there exists some g ∈ G such that Pr[g(x) = 1] ≥ γ − 2ε and | Pr[D(X) = 1 | g(x) = 1] − b 1 (D, p)| > γ − 2ε. By the assumption of auditability, we can then use the auditing algorithm to find a group g ∈ G that is an (α , β )-unfair certificate of D. By Lemma C.1, we know that either g or ¬g predicts D with an accuracy of at least 1/2 + α β − 3ε.
Pr
In the reverse direction: consider the auditing problem on the classifier D. We can treat each pair (x, D(X)) as a labelled example and learn a hypothesis in G that approximates the decisions made by D. Suppose that D is (α, β)-unfair. Then by Lemma C.1, we know that there exists some g ∈ G such that Pr[D(X) = g(x)] ≥ 1/2 + αβ − 3ε. Therefore, the weak agnostic learning algorithm from the hypothesis of the theorem will return some g with Pr[D(X) = g (x)] ≥ 1/2 + γ. By Lemma C.2, we know g or ¬g is a (γ − 3ε, γ − 3ε)-unfair certificate for D.
D Fair Learning with Statistical Parity Fairness
In this section we show that straight forward variants of the two algorithms in Section 4 also solve the learning problem for the constraint of statistical parity (SP) fairness. The crux of both algorithms is the reduction from the best response problems for both the Learner and Auditor to CSC problems. Then if we assume CSC oracles for G and H, we can implement FTPL for the Learner and best response for the auditor, recovering Algorithm 2 and its polytime convergence guarantees for SP fairness. Algorithm 3, fictitious play, is even simpler: we simply use the CSC oracles to have both players best respond to the empirical average of the other player's strategies. We now derive the CSC reductions, starting from rewriting the constrained optimization problem for statistical parity.
Rewriting the SP Fair ERM LP. Analogously for statistical parity fairness we define G α = {g ∈ G| Pr P [g(x) = 1] ≥ α}. Let p denote a probability distribution over H. We aim to solve the following "Fair ERM" problem: 
where err(h, P ) = Pr P [h(x, x ) y]. As before we we will write G(S) and H(S) to denote the set of all labellings on S that are induced by G α and H respectively, that is G(S) = {(g(x 1 ), . . . , g(x n )) | g ∈ G α } and, H(S) = {(h(X 1 ), . . . , h(X n )) | h ∈ H}
We now write the ERM LP as an optimization where the distribution is over labellings in H(S) and the set of subgroups is defined by labellings in G(S). We also rewrite the constraints again in a way that will reduce the problem of finding the most violated constraint (Auditor best response) to a cost-sensitive classification problem. We define: As before we now focus on the following optimization problem which is easily seen to be equivalent to the original LP:
such that for each g ∈ G(S) : Φ + (p, g) ≤ 0 (26) Φ − (p, g) ≤ 0
We then form the partial Lagrangian of the LP, and view it as a zero-sum two player game with payoff function U (h, λ) = err(h, P ) + g∈G(S)
To derive analogous Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 2 for SP fairness, we just need to reduce the best response problems for the primal (Learner) and dual (Auditor) players to cost-sensitive classification problems.
Learner's best response. Fix any mixed strategy (dual solution) λ of the Auditor. Then the Learner's best response is given by: min h∈H err(h, P ) + g∈G(S)
We can reduce this problem to one that can be solved with a single call to a cost-sensitive classification oracle. In particular, we can find a best response for the Learner by making a call to the cost-sensitive classification oracle, in which we assign costs to each example (X i , y i ) as follows:
• if y i = 1, then c 0 i = 0 and c 1 i = − 1 n + 1 n g∈G α (λ + g − λ − g ) (Pr[g(x) = 1] − 1)1[g(x i = 1)];
• otherwise, c 0 i = 0 and c 1 i = 1 n + 1 n g∈G α (λ + g − λ − g ) (Pr[g(x) = 1] − 1)1[g(x i = 1)]
Crucially, we can now define LC(λ) i = c 1 i , and write the Learner's optimization problem as:
min p∈∆ H(S) p, LC(λ)
If we fix λ =λ t , the empirical average dual vector, we can either solve the linear optimization directly using the CSC oracle (Algorithm 3) or solve it noisily using FTPL (Algorithm 2).
The Auditor's best response is given by: argmax λ∈Λ err(p, P ) + g∈G(S)
(29) To solve this best response problem, consider the problem of computing (ĝ,•) = argmax (g,•) Φ • (p, g). There are two cases. In the first case, p is a strictly feasible primal solution: that is Φ•(p,ĝ) < 0. In this case, the solution sets λ = 0. Otherwise, if p is not strictly feasible, the best response is to set λ•ĝ = C (and all other coordinates to 0). Therefore, it suffices to solve for argmax (g,•) Φ • (p, g). We will proceed by solving argmax g Φ + (p, g) and argmax g Φ − (p, g) separately: both problems can be reduced to a cost-sensitive classification problem. To solve for argmax g Φ + (p, g) with a CSC oracle, we assign costs to each example (X i , y i ) as follows:
• c 0 i = 0 and
To solve for argmax g Φ − (p, g) with a CSC oracle, we set c 0 i = 0, and set
Now since we have reduced computing the best response for both the Learner and Auditor to solving a CSC problem, with oracles for solving CSC in hand (e.g. agnostic learners), it is straightforward to implement the natural variants of Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 for statistical parity fairness.
